Cloud-Storage has become part of the standard toolkit for enterprisegrade computing. While being cost-and energy-e cient, cloud storage's availability and data con dentiality can be problematic. A common approach of mitigating those issues are cloud-of-cloud solutions. Another challenge is the integration of such a solution into existing legacy systems. is paper introduces the Archistar Backup Proxy which allows integration of multi-cloud storage into existing legacy enterprise computing landscapes by overloading the industry-standard Amazon S3 protocol. e paper provides multiple lessons-learned during implementation and concludes with a performance evaluation with traditional backup solutions utilizing redundant remote storage.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage has become a commodity technique, commonly used by companies to dynamically outsource their data storage onto third-party servers. Bene ts include increased agility leading to decreased monetary costs, access to managed storage without having to employ storage specialists as well as improved o -site disaster recovery. Drawbacks are the increased dependency upon thirdparties, vendor lock-in, loss of data sovereignty and privacy as well as service-level agreements that do not allow contractual enforcement of storage availability and achieved performance.
While companies would like to reap the monetary bene ts, data con dentiality issues prevent cloud adaption, esp. with the new, Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. ARES '17, Reggio Calabria, Italy potentially existence-threatening, nes contained in the upcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union. Companies outsourcing their sensitive backup data require strict data con dentiality as well as resilience in case of partial cloud failures.
A new approach that allows to mitigate some of those problems is the cloud-of-cloud [2] or multi-cloud paradigm. Storage systems that ful ll this technique disperse their data redundantly over multiple independent storage clouds, thus limiting the damage potential of each single storage provider. Furthermore, if secret sharing is used for creating the split-up data, increased data con dentiality can be gained and traditional security assumptions-such as mathematical strength of encryption algorithms-are replaced with a non-collusion assumption between the involved storage providers.
e contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will introduce the Archistar-S3-Proxy that allows transparent multi-modal data distribution between multiple public clouds. We embrace and enhance existing storage technologies and protocols to allow for integration into existing enterprise storage systems. e basic concept of the Archistar Backup Proxy is: to accept archive data from a backup client or server through the Amazon Simple Storage System (S3) interface, apply secret-sharing to enforce data con dentiality, integrity and availability, and to nally store the encrypted data upon multiple cloud storage providers.
On the other hand, we report signi cant performance improvements of the Archistar-Smc cryptographic library, which was used to build the proxy and is the most versatile and integrated cryptographic secret sharing library available in Java. Archistar-Smc is part of the cryptographic toolkit [22] developed in the PRIS-MACLOUD project [21] and actively maintained by AIT. e further layout of this paper is as follows: section 2 gives a rough overview of secret-sharing algorithms and existing multicloud storage solutions. Section 3 describes the design choices and high-level architecture of Archistar-S3-Proxy; section 4 highlights challenges, limitations and their solutions as well as performance ndings discovered during implementation. Section 5 concludes this paper with a short description of our ndings as well as teasing contemporary and future work.
RELATED WORK
Secret-sharing is the technique utilized by the Archistar Proxy to split up data into multiple fragments. Clients will interact with the proxy through a selected storage protocol. Finally, we will give a typical example of a storage system utilizing the cloud-of-clouds approach.
An important aspect of a so ware system is the adversary model that the system was designed with. Figure 1a shows a typical cloud backup scenario: multiple backup clients and servers communicate with the backup proxy which, in turn, communicates with multiple cloud storage providers at the bo om. A simpli ed version of the data-ow can be seen in Figure 1b .
In a traditional backup system, everything but the backup client is trusted.
e backup servers and storage gateways are fully trusted; the backend storage servers are assumed to behave nonmalicious, e.g., stored data might be corrupted due to bitrot but not be maliciously altered or extracted.
e Archistar backup proxy assumes that, in addition to the clients, the backend storage can fail arbitrarily too. Recent cloud outages and breaches 12 have shown that this a reasonable assumption. While the Archistar proxy enforces correct behaviour of backup servers, it cannot verify the transmi ed plain-text data for correctness. To improve this situation a versioning scheme with the capability to reset to older versions is provided. Archistar assumes the existence of a single proxy; if scaling mandates the usage of multiple proxies, distribution schemes such as Paxos [18] or RAFT [24] can be utilized. If each of those proxies cannot be fully trusted, complex and expensive protocols such as PBFT [6] can be utilized to implement byzantine fault-tolerant systems.
We assume that data-in-transit is protected by state-of-the-art security mechanisms, i.e., TLSv1.2 with data con dentiality and integrity protection. Ideally, for long-term secure storage, the connections would be secured by ITS secure mechanisms like quantum communication [25] , however, this technology is very expensive and can only cover limited distances. It is also limited in rate which requires computational secure hybrid solutions [23] to be used in storage scenarios anyways.
Secret-Sharing
Secret-sharing describes a family of algorithms that allow to split up plain-text data into n parts, k of which are needed to reconstruct the original data. is de nition implies that k < n; if k ≤ n then n − k missing parts can be tolerated during reconstruction. e archetypal secret-sharing algorithm is Shamir's Secret Sharing [28] . While introducing a high dependency upon generated random numbers as well as signi cant storage overhead this algorithm is information theoretical secure, i.e., even an adversary with unlimited processing power can only randomly guess the plain-text data. Another o en used algorithm is Rabin [26] which increased information safety by adding redundancy during data distribution. While not improving con dentiality it allows for highly e cient data dispersal. Krawczyk combined both schemes in [16] . Plaintext data is symmetrically encrypted using a generated secret-key. e encrypted data is dispersed using Rabin while the secret key is distributed using Shamir's Secret Sharing. While this only provides computational security, this approach yields high storage e ciency. Table 1 gives an overview of the discussed algorithms and their characteristics.
Storage Protocols
Storage systems can be classi ed according to the data access methods they are providing to their clients. Most storage interfaces fall Table 1 : Characteristics of selected secret-sharing algorithms. Storage overhead is noted as factor based upon the original storage size l. n is the total amount of servers needed, k denotes how many fragments are needed to reconstruct the original data. An overhead factor of 1.0 denotes that the resulting share size is the same as the original data, i.e., that there is no overhead.
Algorithm Con dentiality Storage Overhead Shamir ITS n Rabin n/k Krawczyk computational n/k + size ke * n/l into one of the following classes: remote le systems, block storage or key-value stores 3 . In addition systems can be classi ed due to the CAP theorem [9] -denoting Consistency, Availability and Partition Tolerance. e theorem states, that a system can ful ll a maximum of two out of three of those parameters.
Remote le systems provide hierarchical data storage with high semantics [27] . In case of cluster le systems parallel write-operations by multiple clients while keeping strong consistency are commonly supported. is high feature level is bought by complexity.
Block-level storage o ers a virtual block device, e.g., a distributed hard-drive. Data representation is not les, but xed-size storage blocks. It is the client's responsibility to provide a le system with all inherent complexities on top of the virtual block device. is reduced feature allows for increased simplicity and thus low latency. In addition the block-level storage is well suited for data deduplication on the lowest layer. is improves storage e ciency but has the inherent drawback of reduced data safety due to reduced redundancy as well as a potential negative con dentiality impact [13] .
Key-Value stores provide functionality akin to non-hierarchical dictionaries [11] . Similar to block-based storage systems they utilize unique keys for identifying data, in contrast to block-storage they allow storage of arbitrarily sized values. ey focus upon availability and horizontal scale-out, i.e., sharding, and have become prominent for cloud applications. e foremost known key-value network protocol is the industry-standard Amazon S3 protocol which is served over HTTPS.
Multi-Cloud Storage
Fault-tolerant cloud storage is a well researched area [30] . Common distinctive features range from concurrent multi-client support, concurrent updates, used consistency model, data deduplication, fault tolerance and cloud storage provider requirements.
RACS [1] utilizes erasure-coding to distribute data over multiple storage clouds. eir main goal is to prevent vendor lock-in and to achieve high availability; privacy concerns are not discussed. It mimics the Amazon S3 interface for communication with its clients. If a single RACS installation becomes a performance bo leneck, distributed RACS can be deployed: it uses Apache Zookeeper [15] for message ordering/storage and is thus a crash-fault tolerant solution.
e HAIL system [5] focuses upon high-availability and integrity protection within the cloud; data privacy is not of primary concern. To achieve high availability, data is distributed (using erasure codes) upon multiple clouds. Data stored upon a single server is also redundantly stored to increase its resistance against bitrot. To verify the availability and correctness of data, a proof-of-retrievability protocol based upon active servers has been developed.
DepSky [4] o ers an object-store interface on top of passive storage clouds. Its data objects utilize cryptographic hashes for integrity control; short-time version numbers provide for concurrent updates. As no active server components can be used, the system cannot cope with malicious writers. Multiple concurrent writers are supported through client-side locks: this allows for obstructionfree, but not wait-free, operation. Cloud providers are allowed to fail in Byzantine ways. Con dentiality is optionally supported by secret-sharing techniques in the DepSky-CA variant.
Fork-based systems [19] achieve consistency by exploiting version information. Multiple clients update the server-side data and, through that, create potential con icting change histories. If a malicious change has been detected, clients are responsible to rollback to a known good version. is approach is well suited if clients can detect failures, are able to perform the rollback operation and incorporating potential malicious data can be coped with.
Another potential solution is the combination of a byzantine fault-tolerant distribution algorithm with erasure-coding [10] . Byzantine faults are arbitrary faults, well suited to model, e.g., a malicious a acker as well as bit-rot due to erroneous hardware. A drawback of PBFT-based solutions is the dependency upon active servers, the need for servers communicating with each other as well as the high message count and round-trip overhead. Using erase-codes does not provide for data con dentiality; a natural evolution of this approach is the addition of secret-sharing [20] . e adversary model for such a system becomes complex, esp. if malicious clients should be able to be coped with [12] .
ARCHITECTURE
e Archistar Backup Proxy uses secret-sharing to split up archive data-provided by an existing backup solution-into encrypted shares and then distributes those shares upon multiple potentially untrusted cloud storage providers. A simpli ed representation of our system architecture is shown in Figure 1a , a simpli ed version of the data ow is shown in Figure 1b .
We target the enterprise backup sector, this leads to multiple simpli cations for the resulting so ware architecture. Enterprise backup clients typically connect to a single backup server which used to store the clients' data upon tape drives but recently have begun to exchange those tape decks with cheap online cloud storage. Existing Enterprise Backup Solutions commonly support the Amazon S3 protocol for backend storage. By providing an emulation of this protocol, the Archistar Backup Proxy becomes a drop-in network component. While this improves the interoperability, the situation is not perfect: not all backup solutions utilize the same Amazon S3 subset. e resulting system is inherently single-user: while multiple clients connect to the backup server, just a single backup server will connect to the Archistar Backup Proxy. While the backup proxy itself might provide multi-user support to its clients, the overall system is still a single-client system with the backup proxy being the single storage client. e single-user nature of the system allows to delegate large parts of the user authentication and authorization problem to the backup server so ware. As we target real-world deployments, we cannot assume active servers with code-execution capabilities. is reduces our server-side options as many storage systems mandate active servers with communication channels between them, e.g., PBFT-based solutions [10] , or active servers with user-supplied code, e.g., fork-consistency based systems.
A high-level bene t of the backup storage sector is its focus upon bandwidth. In contrast, desktop-level interactive applications are forced to focus upon latency. As we can thus allow for higher latencies, this enables easy implementation of batching and caching, thus further improving the achieved bandwidth.
As mentioned, we have chosen the Amazon S3 protocol for client interactions due to its mass market adaption. We also support the Amazon S3 protocol for interaction with our backend storage providers but o er additional in-memory and local-storage providers for testing purposes. e concrete storage driver implementations are abstracted behind an interface, so supporting other cloud providers or modes of storage is a ma er of implementing few very basic methods. Apart from utility functions -for connecting and disconnecting, returning status information -one only needs to provide methods for storing, retrieving, and deleting binary objects. As the proxy server keeps its own metadata within its index, no methods for listing directories or retrieving le stats are needed.
e index itself is a container for le data, i.e., a le's original name, size, SHA-256 and MD5 4 hashes, modi cation date, content type, used secret-sharing algorithm and metadata. In addition, le data includes information on where its secret-shared parts are stored. is is needed, as we store each under a separate identi er to hamper data analysis. Apart from that, each index can -depending on the versioning con guration -contain a reference to its predecessor. As each index includes information about all available les and directories, this allows for implicit versioning of all data. To reduce storage overhead, the number of stored versions, reaching from zero to in nity, can be con gured through the backup server's con guration.
Secret-sharing is utilized to distribute the index upon the available storage clouds. It is therefore only identi ed by its unique random identi er 5 ; to identify the current index, a special le with a xed name is used akin to a super-block in lesystem design. In order not to have to retrieve the current index on every operation and thus spare round-trips, it is cached locally. Storage operations that do not manipulate actual le data, are thus "cheap". If we assume single-proxy operation, we do not have to check if our locally cached index and the server-side index are identical. Listing all stored les, or retrieving the metadata of one speci c le, does not entail any backend operations. is is paramount for performance, as some clients issue a surprisingly high number of such requests before and a er each actual le operation. In addition this allows the backup server to be er cope with the potential high-latency during accessing networked Amazon S3-compatible storage servers.
eoretical Secret-Sharing Performance
e performance overhead of the Archistar Proxy system can be measured through latency, minimal number of needed servers, storage overhead and throughput. Given a storage system that must be able to cope with f faulty storage locations, traditional cloud storage systems that provide redundant fault-tolerant storage must distribute the original data upon (at least) k = f + 1 servers. e storage overhead is thus f + 1. Erasure-Coding has a similar amount of needed servers, but the storage-overhead per server is reduced by a factor of k.
With information-theoretical secure secret-sharing there is the additional condition that collaborating storage providers should not be able to reconstruct the original data: k = f + 1, n − k > f . If we transform the la er this leads to n = 2f + 1. Table 2 shows the overhead results for di erent values of f . It can be seen that while secret-sharing increases the amount of minimal servers, the overall storage overhead depends upon the chosen secret-sharing algorithm. When information-theoretical secret-sharing is used, the overhead is higher than a comparable redundant backup solution. When computational secure secret-sharing is used, it is lower.
Another important metric for backup systems is their throughput. e achieved (simpli ed) throughput is the minimum of the incoming (local) network throughput, the secret-sharing engine's throughput as well the achievable outgoing (public) network throughput. We assume the internal network to be of in nite capacity and that our baseline -a traditional backup solution that uses simple redundancy -saturates the available outgoing network bandwidth. If we assume a scenario of f = 1, i.e., the user wants at least minimal safety from redundancy, then the impact upon throughput should be the ratio of secret-sharing overhead divided by the traditional overhead. When using the estimated overhead from Table 2 , it can be seen that information-theoretical secure secret-sharing would decrease the throughput, while computational secure secretsharing would actually improve it.
e throughput of the used secret-sharing engine thus becomes the limiting factor. As a reference, Table 4 shows the measured performance of our secret-sharing library upon multiple platforms.
Availability Model
In reliability theory an n-component system that works if and only if at least k of the n components work is called a k-out-of-n:G system. e presented storage system is exactly implementing such a structure in a multi-cloud se ing which lets us directly apply some results from reliability theory in our availability analysis.
In particular, the reliability R(k, n) of a k-out-of-n:G system with i.i.d. components, i.e., components which are independent of each other, is equal to the probability that the number of working components is greater than or equal to k. In particular the reliability is calculated as follows.
e k-out-of-n is a generic model for adding fault tolerance to systems by increasing redundancy, which is exactly what we are doing with secret sharing in the Archistar system, if we leave the security aspects aside for this treatment.
If we compare the di erent se ings presented in the previous section with the reliability model we get the following results. For the case of data replication we have k = 1, which leads to the analogous of a parallel system in the reliability model and R(1, n)
For the cases of perfectly secure (ITS) secret sharing and computational secret sharing the reliability parameters can exibly be adjusted through encoding between 1 ≤ k ≤ n, which leads to a non trivial k-out-of-n system if k is selected accordingly (k > 1 and k < n). However, if the redundancy is fully removed for security reasons (k = n), the systems becomes a simple series system with R(n, n) = n i=1 p i = p n . us, from a reliability standpoint, both secret sharing variants provide the same 
level of reliability, although providing di erent levels of security and storage overhead. Now, if we use the previous treatment to model the availability of our solution, the basic characteristics can be directly applied. As we show here, we can also use this approach to design our system based on availability criteria we have to ful ll for the data stored. Enabling this SLA tailoring via multi-cloud con gurations is very a ractive, because the standard cloud storage market provides only limited exibility in the con guration of service level agreements (SLA). In many cases main design criteria like availability goals are not even clearly stated in provider SLA 6 , nor is there any real compensation foreseen in case of violation, except for some minor service credits. In fact, serving standardized SLAs to customers is a major feature of cloud computing which helps to enable the elasticity and self-service capabilities the customers want to have. However, as a downside of this approach, it is very di cult for customers to nd o erings which perfectly t their particular needs and almost impossible to negotiate special conditions.
Archistar is trying to solve this problem in a di erent way, i.e., by le ing the customer design a storage system according their needs and requirements as a fault tolerant composition of di erent cloud o erings. In particular, the k-out-of-n paradigm is used to design systems which can theoretically provide arbitrary high levels of availability. Availability classes are typically given as number of leading nines of the availability value, i.e., a "three nines" availability means 99.9% which corresponds to a downtime of 8.76h per year or 43.8min per month. We used this type of availability classes to demonstrate the theoretical values we can reach in our system with reasonable number of storage nodes.
In table 3 we show the calculated availability classes for di erent con gurations of n and k, whereby an overall availability of 98% (p = 0.98) is assumed for the individual cloud storage o erings used to store the data fragments. It is easy to see, that for all typical requirements con guration parameters exist. e system is giving the cloud customer much more exibility and enables him to design his own SLA for a virtual Archistar storage service with respect to availability, con dentiality and integrity on top of existing cloud o erings. is can also help to speed up and improve the cloud migration process in general [14] . Furthermore, if the con gurations would be matched against cloud services databases, the best provider o erings can be selected to also get a price optimal solution. Nevertheless, a more detailed model also considering failure modes like network outages and data loss would be desirable and is le for future work. Table 3 : Number of leading nines for system reliability R(k, n) for given n and k and a individual storage node reliability of p = 0.98, which is a typical value taken from cloud storage provider SLA. 
Backend Concerns
One of our backup proxy's goals is interoperability. us we not just provide a standard S3 interface to our clients, but also must allow for multiple backend storage options. To achieve this, our design is based on the lowest sensible common denominator. For the most part, this is not a signi cant limitation-our requirements are modest, and major cloud providers do or will soon provide a matching set of features. One notable exception is Amazon's provided data consistency model for its operations. Its eventualconsistency model is far weaker than the strong-consistency model provided by other cloud providers. As a consequence, we can not support parallel data operations by multiple proxies on shared sets of stored data. A single proxy installation is therefore intended to only ever work on a set of stored data that does not overlap with that of any other proxy. A good example for an advanced but well-supported utilized feature is metadata management. Almost all cloud storage providers provide (under various names) operations on user-de ned metadata that can be manipulated separately from the object to which they are a ached. ough the concrete limitations regarding size and shape di er from provider to provider, our requirements in this regard are modest enough that all the le-level metadata needed for our secret sharing engine can be stored in that way.
Client-Facing Concerns
e Archistar backup proxy provides a subset of the industrystandard Amazon S3 protocol. e Amazon S3 protocol is a RESTful HTTP-based key-value storage protocol. Data is identi ed by nonhierarchical unique alpha-numeric keys; data itself is assumed to be a binary large object. To be er implement a lesystem-like interface, keys can be grouped by a common pre x -this allows to emulate directories by using a full path as key. Each object can contain both prede ned, e.g., user and access information, and user-de ned meta-data.
To allow upload of large les through the HTTP a multi-part upload functionality is provided. is introduces a transaction-like process, within which a client can upload multiple smaller parts of a le and where during the nalization of the transaction, those parts are combined to the nally stored object.
We implement basic authentication using statically con gured credentials against which incoming client requests are authenticated. We were not able to implement the sophisticated authorization features of S3 as this would require either deep access to Amazon customer data, or replicating its Identity and Access Management (Amazon IAM) infrastructure. As this is a common problem with Amazon S3-compatible implementations, this lack is not serious -all of the backup servers/clients which we have so far integrated, utilized only a small part of the S3 interface.
A bene t of using the S3 protocol is that, due to it being a key/value store, deduplication is relatively easy [29] . Deduplication is an important feature as many backup clients perform UNIX-style atomic le updates/uploads by initially uploading a temporary le, then making a copy of it under the nal name, and nally deleting the temporary le. Deduplicating here has the obvious bene t that only the initial upload le operation is actually being performed on a data-level, while the subsequent operations only modify data within the -potentially cached -index. is reduces round-trips and thus improves performance.
One feature that the S3 protocol o ers and will be supported by our backup proxy is versioning. Already it is possible to con gure the proxy so that les are never actually deleted, or only a er certain criteria are met. e open question is whether, and if so, how to expose this functionality via S3. e straightforward solution would of course be to integrate it with the versioning facilities of S3, but not many client actually use this feature. For most clients, S3 is just one of many supported backends; they therefore avoid depending too much on S3-speci c features, or even on features that are speci c to cloud key/value stores.
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
is section describes ndings that were discovered during implementation. In contrast to the "Architecture"-ndings, these ndings are more concerned with mechanics and protocol choices.
S3 Integration Challenges
During implementation of the proxy prototype, we discovered signi cant negative performance interactions between our initial data representation and the Amazon S3 protocol, leading to decreased performance and scalability.
As mentioned before, S3 is a key/value store with an assumed at, i.e., non hierarchical, key space whose internal value structure is orthogonal to the protocol. Sadly, this is not what clients expect: when dealing with les, instead of a at name space, one would probably like to have directories. For handling large les, incremental up-and download facilities would be useful. S3 provides for this: in the case of directories, this is done by treating directory names as "common pre xes". For incremental uploads of large les, there is a special "Multipart Upload" operation. As for downloading big les, S3 makes use of byte-wise access through HTTP Range headers 7 . As our security model assumes that we only serve (and integrity-check) whole les, this introduces a payo between security and performance -either we retrieve, reconstruct, and serve just the requested part of the le but are then not able to verify its integrity, or we can retrieve the whole le, check it, and serve only the requested part. is is further exacerbated by the fact that client can -via the Range headers -specify arbitrary ranges to be retrieved. e size of the "chunks" in which the le is retrieved cannot a priori be determined and thus, no check-sum be pre-calculated. A 150MB le might be retrieved in 2 chunks, or in 16.
is does not only impact performance. Our current prototype implementation is based on Java byte arrays for incoming data, processing as well as for outgoing data. is has obvious negative implications for memory usage, but also less obvious implications for stability. For every l bytes of input, at least n + 1 byte arrays of length l have to be allocated by the Java virtual machine. In typical use, allocations do not fail, but in principle, the JVM can throw an OutOfMemoryError at any time -as we have found, frequently accessing les of moderate size such as 50 Megabyte are sometimes enough to trigger this condition. is happens exactly when a client sends multiple requests for di erent ranges of the same le.
Secret-Sharing Engine Performance
When analyzing the sequential single-thread performance of our data-processing engine, the typical culprits can be found: nite eld multiplication and random number generation. Speeding up nite eld multiplication is an intensively researched subject, but for our speci c purposes of bit elds of width 8, we found the approach of using lookup tables more than adequate. A high random number generation rate is paramount, because when using Shamir's secretsharing algorithm, for every byte of input, k −1 bytes of randomness must be generated. e availability of a high-performance hardware random number generator is thus highly recommended. e singlethread performance of our secret-engine can be seen in Table 4 .
Our current prototype uses a sequential and single-threaded secret-sharing engine. To improve performance we are o ering a rst version of a parallelized erasure coding algorithm. We are investigating the potential of spli ing up the workload upon multiple CPU cores, esp., to be be er suited for operation on dedicated network hardware which o en provides many low-performance CPU cores. Rabin's algorithm allows for easy optimization, as each of the n output shares can be generated on a di erent core because no synchronization between them is necessary. Shamir's algorithm depends upon k − 1 generated random bytes for every byte of input, Table 5 . Please note, that we are currently parallelizing up to n (maximum number of shares) threads -in our test-case, the embedded Intel Atom processor would o er more cores than our maximum number of shares, thus no full utilization of the processor cores is achieved. ere is a slight performance hit when the multi-threaded code is run on a single-core processor: this is grounded within the initial setup overhead of the multithreaded code. To get the best performance, two separate versions of the library (or instantiations within the library) for single-and multi-core usecases might be advantageous. e speed-up for Rabin on a quad-core was around the expected factor of four. Krawczyk is a combination of Shamir, Rabin and symmetrical encryption. e secret-sharing key is shared using Shamir, the original data is encrypted using a traditional symmetric encryption and then shared with Rabin. If the existing symmetric encryption library (BouncyCastle in our case) scales as well as our new parallelized Rabin code, then Krawczyk should also improve around a factor of 4. As our empirical tests have shown, a factor of 2 is achieved. is indicates that the existing symmetric encryption engine also has become a bo leneck with our new code. Future research into alternative cryptographic engine as well as into Java 9 (which improves hardware support for cryptographic directives prevalent in modern processors) is planned.
Another possibility is to split the input across its length. In that case, the problem becomes the assembly and ordering of the generated output. Currently, this is feasible as both input and output bu ers are byte arrays. Parallelization can be achieved by computing indices within those arrays. Alas, as mentioned before, byte arrays are not a scalable solution. erefore, we will switch to a stream-based implementation, which renders this parallelization approach infeasible. For further optimization, we performed pre-processing of constant factors for common operations. E.g., when sharing a secret, for every generated output share, all multiplications are performed with the same factor. We are currently investigating another example of preprocessing: when reconstructing a secret, a decoder matrix has to be generated -instead of using generic matrix multiplication we could decompose and simplify the matrix.
When testing multiple input le sizes, we found that a block size of 4 Kilobyte produced signi cantly reduced performance. With larger input sizes, the performance was generally constant on the Intel Core i5 CPU. On passively cooled embedded devices (ARM as well as Intel Atom processors) the power-and thermal management prevented the creation of reproducible performance benchmarks. Future research in to the power consumptions and thermal impact of di ernet algorithms might be needed. An overview of the recorded throughput values can be seen in Table 6 .
FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
We presented the Archistar Backup Proxy that allows integration of secret-sharing multi-clouds into existing legacy enterprise storage systems. We addressed the common belief that secret-sharing techniques are problematic for both storage overhead and throughput.
In future work, we hope to increase the achieved bandwidth through the mentioned secret-sharing engine improvements. Another future work-item is a detailed performance comparison with competing solutions such as DepSky [4] and byzantine-fault tolerant active solutions. Feature-wise, rst a empts of integrating private information retrieval (PIR [7] ) and remote data checking (RDC [3] ) are underway.
Furthermore we will integrate novel veri cation protocols [8, 17 ] to increase the systems resilience and security. e protocols have been speci cally designed for Archistar and with with e ciency in mind, i.e., for large distributed storage of unstructured data.
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